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Jury Computation of Front Pay Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
Brian S. Felton
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)1 to "promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment; [and] to help employers and work-
ers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment."2 Within the last decade, all federal cir-
cuit courts addressing the issue have held that the Act permits
awards for future income that the employee would have earned
were it not for the employer's discrimination.3 These courts do
not agree, however, on whether the judge or the jury should
calculate the amount of these "front pay" damages.4 The reso-
1. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988). For a general survey of the history, cover-
age, enforcement, and administration of the ADEA, see JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw (1986).
3. See Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1423 (4th Cir.), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 429 (1991); Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461,
1469 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 842 (1989); McNeil v. Economics Lab.,
Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985); Maxfield v.
Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986);
EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 (10th Cir.),
cert denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., 758 F.2d 1435,
1448-49 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985); Whittlesey v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, 742
F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093,
1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
4. Compare, ag., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1991)
with Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 892-93 (6th Cir. 1988).
Courts have defined front pay in various ways. See, e.g., McKnight v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 116 (7th Cir. 1990) ("the discounted present
value of the difference between the earnings [the plaintiff] would have re-
ceived in his old employment and the earnings he can be expected to receive
in his present and future, and by hypothesis inferior, employment"), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1306 (1991); Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th
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lution of this conflict may significantly affect the amount of
front pay awards granted under the Act.5
This Note argues that the ADEA permits jury computation
of front pay awards. Part I discusses the remedial scheme of
the Act and its jury trial provisions. Part II outlines the
Supreme Court's approach to the right to a jury trial granted
by the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This Part also discusses two exceptions to the right to a jury
trial that courts have employed in denying a jury trial on front
Cir. 1990) ("present value of the future income that the ... plaintiff would
have earned if he/she would have remained in the defendant's employ for the
rest of his/her working life"); Hansard, 865 F.2d at 1469 ("future lost earn-
ings"); Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 892 n.14 (6th Cir.
1988) ("any salary and benefits [the plaintiff] would have received in the fu-
ture"); Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 796 ("award for future earnings ... as an alterna-
tive remedy to reinstatement"); Stafford v. Electric Data Sys. Corp., 741 F.
Supp. 664, 665 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1990) ("an employee's loss of future income for a
period after the date of trial").
Front pay awards include lost future wages, see, e.g., Reneau v. Wayne
Griffin & Sons, 945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1991), and may include lost pension
benefits, see, e.g., Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1212 (7th
Cir. 1989); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 1987). Some
courts have taken a broader view of front pay and have included the entire
employment benefit package in the remedy. See, e.g., Nordquist v. Uddeholm
Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1191, 1204 (D. Conn. 1985). But see Berndt v. Kaiser Alu-
minum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 962, 966 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (excluding
fringe benefits from front pay award because of their speculative nature).
Front pay provides prospective relief from the date of judgment. In con-
trast, back pay returns to plaintiffs the value of the compensation they would
have earned had they remained in the defendants' employ from the date of
discharge to the trial date after subtracting the value of their compensation at
other jobs for the same period. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F.
Supp. 214, 220 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd in part & rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 1543
(11th Cir. 1984).
Although commentators have discussed and advocated front pay as an al-
ternative to reinstatement under the ADEA, they have failed to discuss in any
depth whether the judge or jury should compute front pay under the Act.
Most simply assume that the judge should compute the award. See Timothy E.
Hawks, Future Damages in ADEA Cases, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 357 (1986); J. Har-
din Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 45 MD. L. REV. 298, 331-38 (1986); Peter Janovsky, Note,
Front Pay: A Necessary Alternative to Reinstatement Under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 579 (1984); Michele K.
Kemler, Note, Front Pay as an Appropriate Remedy Under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 32 WAYNE L. REv. 115 (1985).
5. At least one empirical study has demonstrated that, on average, juries
give larger awards than judges. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the
Civil Jury, 31 J. AM. TRIAL LAW. Ass'N 589, 597-98 (1965); see also JOHN
GuiNTHER, THE JURY iN AMERICA 169-72 (1988) (arguing that although juries




pay damages in non-ADEA contexts. Part III examines the ap-
proaches courts have taken in determining whether the ADEA
grants plaintiffs the right to have a jury compute their front
pay. Part IV concludes that because Congress intended to com-
ply with current Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, courts
should interpret the ADEA as providing the right to jury com-
putation of front pay. This Note argues that the reasons courts
typically cite in denying a plaintiff a jury trial on the amount of
front pay damages run contrary to Seventh Amendment doc-
trine and threaten to undermine that "right so fundamental
and sacred to the citizen,"'8 the constitutional right to a jury
trial.
I. FRONT PAY UNDER THE ADEA
The ADEA provides remedies for individuals who have
suffered age-based discrimination in the workplace.7 As a rem-
edy for a violation of the Act, plaintiffs may use the enforce-
ment provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to
recover lost wages and job-related benefits.8 Also, when em-
ployers wilfully violate the Act, plaintiffs may recover liqui-
dated damages equal to their pecuniary loss.9 Finally, in ADEA
actions, the court may grant additional legal or equitable relief
to carry out the purposes of the Act.10 Despite initial uncer-
6. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752 (1942).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988); see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399
(1991); Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978). The Act applies to employers, employment
agencies, and labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988).
8. The ADEA provides: "Amounts owing to a person as a result of a vio-
lation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of [the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 as amended (29 U.S.C. 216, 217)]." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1988).
The FLSA provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207
of this title [29 U.S.C. §§ 206 or 207, minimum wage and maximum
hours standards] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected
in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid over-
time compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988); see Loriard, 434 U.S. at 581; see also Re-
becca Marshall, Comment, Bootstrapping a Malice Requirement into ADEA
Liquidated Damage Awards-Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 62 WASH. L. REv.
551, 556-57 (1987) (discussing judicial efforts to define "wilful violation" under
the ADEA).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). The Act provides that:
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tainty,"- all of the federal circuits have now concluded that this
remedial scheme permits a plaintiff to recover front pay in cer-
tain circumstances.12
As enacted in 1967, the ADEA did not expressly provide
for the right to a trial by jury in age discrimination suits. In
1978 the Supreme Court held, in Lorillard v. Pos, that liti-
gants pursuing private civil actions for lost wages under the
ADEA are entitled to jury trials.13 Congress codified the hold-
ing of Lorillard in 1978.14 The amendment authorizes a jury
trial on "any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of
In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have ju-
risdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation
judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or
enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
Id.
Congress gave courts the power to grant this additional relief because it
intended the remedial scheme of the ADEA to be compensatory, not punitive.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 528, 535. Courts have heeded Congress's intent, finding that its
purpose in fashioning ADEA remedies was to make plaintiffs whole. E.g.,
Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469, cert denied,
493 U.S. 842 (1989). For a discussion of the legal and equitable remedies avail-
able under the ADEA, see KAI=r, supra note 2, at 89-137.
11. Compare Grecco v. Spang & Co., 566 F. Supp. 413, 415 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(holding that the ADEA remedial scheme does not permit awards of front
pay), aff'd without op., 779 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985), cer denied, 475 U.S. 1036
(1986) with Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the ADEA grants sufficient power to authorize
awards of front pay).
12. See supra note 3 (collecting cases).
13. 435 U.S. 575, 585 (1978). In Lorillard, in addition to reinstatement, the
plaintiff sought lost wages, liquidated damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. Id-
at 576. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the demand
for jury trial on the claim for lost wages. The Supreme Court upheld the
court of appeals' decision to vacate the trial court's order, concluding that the
structure of the ADEA revealed that Congress intended to provide the right to
a jury trial on legal issues in private actions. Id. at 585. The Court noted that
Congress had selectively incorporated provisions of the FLSA into the ADEA,
inferring that where Congress did not expressly modify the provisions of the
FLSA, it intended to incorporate fully the FLSA's remedies and procedures.
Id- at 582. Because the courts had uniformly recognized the right to a jury
trial under the FLSA, Congress's incorporation of the FLSA enforcement
techniques in the ADEA provided for the right to a jury trial under the Act.
Id. at 582-83. But see Karen L. Peck, Union Liability Under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1087, 1094 (1989) (arguing that
Congress did not intend such a broad incorporation of the remedial provisions
of the FLSA).
14. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 190 (1978) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988)).
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amounts owing as a result of a violation of this chapter, regard-
less of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such
action."'
1 5
The 1978 amendment to the ADEA does not expressly pro-
vide plaintiffs the right to have a jury compute their front pay
claims.' 6 The legislative history, however, indicates that Con-
gress intended to provide for a jury trial on legal issues arising
under the Act. For instance, the House Conference Report
stated that "it is manifest that a party is entitled to have the
factual issues underlying... a claim [for legal relief] decided by
a jury."'17 When Senator Kennedy proposed the original Senate
amendment, he stated: "The amendment guarantees the availa-
bility of a jury trial of legal issues in private actions brought
under the Age Act.' 8 Like the jury trial provision itself, the
legislative history of the 1978 amendment addresses the distinc-
tion between legal and equitable issues in providing for the
right to a jury trial. Neither the amendment nor the legislative
history, however, provides conclusive proof of whether Con-
gress intended for juries to compute front pay.
15. Id. The Conference Committee Report on the 1978 amendments de-
fines "amounts owing" to the victims of a discriminatory discharge in violation
of the ADEA as follows: "First, it includes items of pecuniary or economic
loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-related benefits. Second, it includes
liquidated damages (calculated as an amount equal to the pecuniary loss)
which compensate the aggrieved party for nonpecuniary losses arising out of a
willful violation of the ADEA." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, supra note 10, at 14,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 535.
Congress also amended the Act in 1974 to cover the employment practices
of federal, state, and local governments. Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74-76 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 630(b), 633a (1988)). Jury trials are nonetheless unavailable to plain-
tiffs suing the federal government. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168-69
(1981). See generally Gina V. Ferguson, Case Development, 25 How. L.J. 323
(1982) (discussing the unavailability of a jury trial, under the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, in suits against the federal government).
16. Congress may not have contemplated the remedy of front pay when it
amended the ADEA to provide the right to a jury trial, as few cases involving
front pay under the ADEA had arisen at the time of the 1978 amendments.
Not until after the seminal case of Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), in which the court granted an employee the
salary he would have earned to the date of retirement, were courts faced with
a significant volume of claims for front pay in ADEA actions.
17. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, supra note 10, at 14, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 535.
18. 123 CoNG. REc. 34,317 (1977). The original Senate amendment pro-
vided that "a person shall be entitled to a trial by jury in any action involving
monetary damages (including an action for back pay) regardless of whether
equitable relief is sought by a party in the same action." Id.
1992]
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II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL
A. THE Two-PRONG TEST
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."' 9 The
Supreme Court has determined that the phrase "Suits at com-
mon law" refers to suits in which legal, as opposed to equitable,
rights and remedies are determined and administered. 20 The
Court uses a two-part inquiry to determine whether the Sev-
enth Amendment provides the right to a trial by jury in any
given civil action.2 '
The first prong of the Court's test carries out the Seventh
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
20. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989) (citing Parsons
v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830)). Justice Story, in Parsons v.
Bedford, articulated the prevailing interpretation of the phrase, "Suits at com-
mon law," stating.
The phrase "common law" found in this clause, is used in contradis-
tinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence.... By
common law, [the framers of the amendment] meant what the consti-
tution denominated in the third article "law"; not merely suits ....
but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined,
in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recog-
nized, and equitable remedies were ad itred.... In a just sense,
the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits
which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be
the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.
Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 446-47.
21. The Court, in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), proposed a third
element of the Seventh Amendment inquiry. In a controversial footnote, the
Court wrote: "As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is deter-
mined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n.10. The third prong of the Ross test gener-
ated much academic criticism. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amend-
ment Right to Jury Tria" A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision
Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 486, 526 (1975); Note, The Right to Jury Trial in
Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARv. L. REV.
737, 746 n.73 (1983) ("The Ross test... is neither constitutionally compelled
nor analytically useful."). The Court later limited the scope of this element of
the test, describing the element as an inquiry "into whether Congress has per-
missibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an administrative
agency or specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair the
functioning of the legislative scheme." Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4.
Nonetheless, lower courts occasionally inject a "complexity" exception into
the Seventh Amendment analysis. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying
text.
For a discussion of the evolution of current Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence, see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.5-11.8 (1985);
[Vol. 76:985
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Amendment's preservation of the common law right to a jury
trial on legal issues. Under this prong the Court determines
whether the contemporary action more closely resembles cases
historically tried in the courts of law or in the courts of equity
or admiralty ze In conducting its analysis under this prong, the
Redish, supra, at 490-502; Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 639-49 (1973).
22. See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1345-47 (1990)
(engaging in a historical inquiry to determine the existence of the right to a
jury trial); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987) (comparing a mod-
em statutory action to actions historically tried at law and equity).
The Court has never expressly stated what does and does not constitute a
"resemblance" between modern and historical causes of action. Sometimes the
Court has emphasized the specific nature of the right sued upon, see, e.g.,
Graninanciera, 492 U.S. at 40-41 (finding an analogy to a suit to recover alleg-
edly fraudulent money transfers because actions to recover fraudulent trans-
fers were brought at law in the 18th century), and sometimes it has
emphasized the general nature of the modern action, see, e.g., Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (finding a legal analogy to an action for dam-
ages for breach of statutory duty because such an action "sounds basically in
tort").
In examining "resemblance," however, the Court appears generally to fo-
cus on the elements of the modern and 18th-century actions being compared,
and on the nature of the relations between the parties. For instance, in Terry,
the Court compared a modern duty of fair representation action with an 18th-
century action by a trust beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduciary
duty. 110 S. Ct. at 1346. The Court found the actions analogous because, in
each, the plaintiff could sue only upon showing that the trustee or union failed
to act properly on the plaintiff's behalf. I& In finding the actions analogous,
the Court also relied on the similarity between the duties owed by a trustee to
a beneficiary and those owed by a union to the employees it represents. IML In
contrast, the Court found that the duty of fair representation action did not
resemble an attorney malpractice action historically considered to be legal.
The Court emphasized basic differences in the "underlying relationship[s] be-
tween the parties" that distinguished a malpractice action from one for breach
of the duty of fair representation. I&i at 1347. For instance, while clients con-
trol important decisions concerning their representation, employees repre-
sented by a union have no such control. IM. at 1346-47.
The Court also has struggled with the treatment of a modern suit that is
analogous to 18th-century actions at both law and equity. For instance, in
Tull, the petitioner demanded a jury trial in a suit by the government for a
civil penalty under the Clean Water Act. The Court agreed with the peti-
tioner that the modern suit was analogous to an 18th-century debt action in
the English courts of law. 481 U.S. at 420. The Court also concluded, however,
that the respondent properly analogized the modern suit to an equitable action
to abate a public nuisance. Id. Unable to state whether the modern suit more
closely resembled an action at law or equity, the Court relied solely on the sec-
ond prong, the nature of the remedy sought, to conclude that because a civil
penalty was a legal remedy, the Seventh Amendment gave the plaintiff the
right to a jury trial. Id at 421. Similarly, in Terry, the first prong of the Sev-
enth Amendment inquiry left the Court "in equipoise." 110 S. Ct. at 1347. The
Court found analogous actions in both historically legal and equitable actions.
Nonetheless, because the plaintiffs sought a traditionally legal remedy-com-
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Court compares the modern suit to eighteenth-century actions
brought in the English common law courts. In actions available
in the courts of law in 1791, or in analogous actions,2s the Sev-
enth Amendment provides the right to a jury trial.2
The second element of the Seventh Amendment test is the
determination of whether the remedy sought is "legal" or "eq-
uitable."' The Supreme Court has stated that courts should
consider "the general types of relief provided by courts of law
and equity" but that they should not replicate the historical in-
quiry of the first prong.26 Although the meaning of this lan-
pensatory damages representing back pay and benefits-the Court relied al-
most entirely on the second prong of the test to find a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial. Id. at 1349. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment,
proposing that the Court abandon the historical test and focus solely on the
character of the relief sought. Id. at 1349-53.
23. The contemporary action and its common law analogue need not be
identical so long as the modern action embraces or resembles a common law
form of action. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193-194; Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 446 (1830).
24. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 41 (stating that the Seventh
Amendment seeks, in part, to preserve the right to a jury trial as it existed in
1791 and citing Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447); Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 (holding
that the constitutional right to a jury trial existed in a statutory action for civil
penalty because civil penalties historically could only be enforced in courts of
law); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374-76 (1974) (finding the consti-
tutional right to a jury trial in a statutory landlord-tenant action that resem-
bled the common law action of ejectment); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 477 (1962) (finding the constitutional right to a jury trial in an action for
monetary damages).
25. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1345.
26. Id. at 1348 n.8. Historically, "legal" remedies were those available
from courts of law, while "equitable" remedies were those granted by a court
of equity. Prior to the merger of law and equity, the jurisdiction of these two
bodies was primarily a matter of remedy. Courts of law guaranteed the right
to a jury trial while courts of equity did not. A purely historical analysis could
therefore rely on the forum in which a particular remedy was sought to deter-
mine whether there was a right to a jury trial.
Even at common law, however, the line between law and equity was not
always neatly drawn. Each jurisdiction borrowed functions from the other,
creating a large overlap of functions between law and equity. Fleming James,
Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 658-59 (1963).
Moreover, the characterization of a case as equitable or legal often varied be-
tween one locale and another. Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases:
English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
43, 101-04 (1980); see also FRMDENTHAL Err AL., supra note 21, § 11.4 (discussing
the narrowing of differences between courts of law and equity late in the 17th
century).
In addition, equitable and legal issues often arose in the same transaction.
For instance, one party may have sought an injunction in equity while the de-
fendant in equity brought a related action at law for monetary damages. The
chancellor in this situation had the discretion either to decide the legal issue
[Vol. 76:985
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guage is unclear, courts consider both the historical and
modern conceptions of "legal" and "equitable" remedies under
the second prong. This broad inquiry permits courts to con-
sider, for example, the expansion of adequate legal remedies
brought about by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
The Supreme Court combines both prongs of the test to de-
termine whether a party is entitled to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment.as The Court views the nature of the
remedy sought as the more important element of the Seventh
Amendment inquiry,29 and recently described the search for a
common law analogue for the modern action as merely "pre-
liminary."30  Although the Court continues to apply both
prongs of the Seventh Amendment test, its current approach to
the first prong suggests that the absence of a common law ana-
logue may not defeat the right to a jury trial.31 When the
Court identifies the remedy sought as a legal one, it invariably
or stay the equitable action pending resolution of the legal issue in the court of
law. See PATRICK DEVLIN, NoTE ON THE SUIT AT COMMON LAw IN ENGLAND
AT THE TIME OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT (1791), at 19 (1979) [hereinafter
SUIT AT COMMON LAW].
Generally speaking, however, an action for money damages was deemed
legal and either party could obtain a jury on demand. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1347;
see also Alan H. Schneider, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Sev-
enth Amendment and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 201
(1991) (describing damages as the "distinctive feature" of jury trials). If the
plaintiff sought an injunction or specific performance, however, the action was
equitable and no right to a jury trial existed. FRmDENTHAL ET AL., supra note
21, § 11.3. r
One author has suggested the following reasons for equity's failure to use
a jury: as an administrative officer, the chancellor was not concerned with fa-
cilitating the full trial of cases; the chancellor had become accustomed to rely-
ing on written interrogatories and depositions rather than supervising lengthy
trials; the use of a jury would have required selecting jurors from the locality
of the litigants, at great inconvenience to the jurors, or equity holding nisi
prius sessions, at the chancellor's inconvenience, and; equity may have opposed
the common law's view of the jury as a protector of individual liberties, given
equity's close association with the crown. Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1180-81 (1961).
27. See e.g., Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 477; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over, 359 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1959). Despite its attention to post-merger proce-
dure, the "nature of the remedy" test remains in part a historical inquiry. The
Court continues to adhere to the rule, for instance, that damages form a legal
remedy. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1347-48 (offering no justification for adhering
to this rule other than the tradition at common law).
28. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 41.
29. Id; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); see also Redish, supra
note 21, at 490 (noting that in most cases at common law, the remedy sought
determined whether the suit was equitable or legal).
30. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1347.
31. See supra note 22 (discussing recent cases in which the Court relied
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concludes that the Seventh Amendment provides the right to a
jury trial.
The twofold Seventh Amendment analysis extends to stat-
utory causes of action.32 If a statute involves rights and reme-
dies typically enforceable at law, plaintiffs bringing claims
under the statute have the right to a jury trial absent a func-
tional justification for denying them a jury trial3s
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL
Under the "equitable clean-up doctrine" and the complex
cases exception, courts of equity had jurisdiction to decide some
issues without the aid of a jury. Despite the changes wrought
by the merger of law and equity, courts continue to rely on a
complexity exception and the equitable clean-up doctrine to
justify keeping otherwise legal issues from the jury.
1. The Complexity Debate
Whether the complexity of a legal issue justifies an excep-
tion from the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has
been debated at length.34 At common law, equity courts had ju-
solely on the nature of the remedy sought to find a Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial).
32. See United States v. Tull, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); Curtis, 415 U.S. at
193.
33. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193. A statute may deny such rights, for instance, if
Congress has explicitly committed adjudication of a "public right" to an ad-
ministrative agency. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51
(1989). The term "public rights" describes relations "'between the Govern-
ment and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance
of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments."'
IML at 51 n.8 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). In such a case,
the Supreme Court has stated, trial by jury would conflict with the concept
and purpose of administrative adjudication. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194; see also
FRiEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 21, § 11.6; cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937) (finding a statutory proceeding not to be
equivalent to a common law action for a money judgment and therefore not
invoking the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Seventh
Amendment "requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law."
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974). Nevertheless, the Court
has continued after Pernell to analyze Seventh Amendment rights in statutory
actions according to the two-step inquiry discussed above. Pernell may simply
indicate that "strangeness" to the common law does not result in an automatic
denial of a jury trial.
34. See, e.g., Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 581 (1984); David M.
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risdiction to enjoin legal proceedings where a court of law
lacked an adequate remedy. 5 For instance, an equity court
could step in to decide a monetary claim if the accounts be-
tween the parties were too complicated for the jury to
understand. 8
The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the resulting merger of law and equity rendered uncertain
a court's authority to decide facts underlying legal issues be-
cause of their complexity. The Supreme Court addressed the
issue in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.37 The Court noted that a
court of equity gained jurisdiction when there was no adequate
legal remedy.38 The Court observed, however, that in order for
an equity court to hear a suit on a cause of action cognizable at
law, the plaintiff must show that only a court of equity could
possibly sort out the complicated accounts.3 9 Considering the
district court's new power to appoint masters to help juries in
extraordinarily complicated cases, the Court reasoned that
judges should rarely use equitable powers to impose legal reme-
dies, even for complicated legal issues.40 Although the plaintiff
in Dairy Queen sought an accounting, the Supreme Court held
that a properly instructed jury could readily determine the
damages owed.41
The Court in Dairy Queen implied that the complexity of
an issue will rarely, if ever, render jury verdicts inadequate as
legal remedies. Although subsequent Supreme Court cases sup-
Nocenti, Complex Jury Trials, Due Process, and the Doctrine of Unconstitu-
tional Complexity, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 1 (1983).
35. WIL.AM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY § 25 (1930). Equity devel-
oped as a means for attaining justice when the inflexible common law failed.
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 5 (1956). Because
there was no common law writ for an injunction or specific performance, eq-
uity alone could provide such a remedy. Id In contrast, the common law
courts permitted actions for money damages, and therefore equity usually had
no need to step in where such damages were sought. Id
36. SuiT AT COMMON LAW, supra note 26, at 24-32. But see Morris S. Ar-
nold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 840 (1980) (arguing that the cases discussed
by Lord Devlin do not support a complex case exception to common law juris-
diction). Outside of the action for an accounting, it has been argued that the
relative abilities of judge and jury did not influence the characterization of a
case as legal or equitable. See DE FUNIAK, supra note 35, § 103; Redish, supra
note 21, at 524.
37. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
38. Id at 478.
39. Id-
40. Id-
41. Id. at 479.
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port the result in Dairy Queen,42 lower courts continue to ap-
ply a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial.43 Courts most often apply this exception in multi-
party, multi-issue lawsuits, such as antitrust suits" or other
complex litigation.45
2. The Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine
In addition to expanding the availability of adequate legal
remedies, the Federal Rules allow a party to assert legal and
equitable claims in a single action.4 Under the merged system,
courts face the question of whether an action presenting both
equitable and legal issues gives rise to the right to a jury trial.
If such a right does arise, the courts need to decide to which is-
sues it applies.
The equitable clean-up doctrine adds to the complications
posed by a merged system of procedure.47 The doctrine, also
42. Although the Court later seemed to reverse itself on the complexity
question by injecting into its Seventh Amendment test an inquiry into the
practical limitations of the jury, see supra note 21 (discussing the Ross test),
the Court subsequently abandoned this proposed third prong. See
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (setting forth the cur-
rent Seventh Amendment analysis without the third prong of the Ross test).
The Court has never expressly relied on the practical limitations of jurors to
deny the right to a jury trial.
43. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069,
1089 (3d Cir. 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 444-49 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affd on other grounds sub nom Memorex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). Several commentators have ar-
gued for such an exception. See, e.g., King, supra note 34, at 606-14; Note, The
Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1979).
44. See, e.g., In re Japanese Prods., 631 F.2d at 1089. Japanese Products
involved antitrust charges against a Japanese trading company and seven Jap-
anese television manufacturers. The district court held that the Seventh
Amendment guaranteed a jury trial regardless of the complexity of the issues.
Id. at 1073. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a judge may deny the
parties a jury trial when "a jury would be unable to understand the case and
decide it rationally." Id. at 1089.
45. See, e.g., In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D.
Cal. 1977) (securities litigation involving the consideration of 18 separate cases
and the certification of five separate classes), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 18(a). Rule 2 provides that, "There shall be one
form of action to be known as [a] civil action." Rule 18(a) provides that, "A
party asserting a claim to relief... may join.., as many claims, legal, equita-
ble, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party."
47. For a more detailed discussion of the equitable clean-up doctrine and
its historical development, see A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury:
A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951); John E. Sanchez, Jury
Trials in Hybrid and Non-Hybrid Actions: The Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine
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called "incidental" or "ancillary jurisdiction," historically al-
lowed the chancellor who granted equitable relief to grant legal
relief as well.4 8 This foreclosed jury trials on legal issues that
equity courts treated as incidental to an equitable claim. Under
the clean-up doctrine, the courts of equity addressed legal is-
sues only so far as their decisions were incidental or
subordinate to the determination of some equitable question. 49
The doctrine served to economize litigation by obviating the
need for two separate actions in the courts of law and equity.
Following the merger of law and equity, federal courts re-
tained jurisdiction over equitable and legal issues raised in a
single civil action,5° eliminating the historical justification for
the clean-up doctrine. Hence, post-merger Supreme Court
opinions have disapproved of the doctrine. Addressing a coun-
terclaim under a legal theory in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over, the Court held that when courts of law can provide an
adequate legal remedy on any issue, a party has a constitutional
right to a jury trial on that issue regardless of whether equita-
ble issues arise in the same suit.51 Then, in Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood,52 the Court stated that "the [rule] that the right to
trial by jury may be lost as to legal issues where those issues
are characterized as 'incidental' to equitable issues . . .may
[not] be applied in federal courts."5 3 The Court's refusal to ap-
in the Guise of Inseparability and Other Analytical Problems, 38 DEPAuL L.
REv. 627, 641-48 (1989).
48. Under the clean-up doctrine, once equity "properly acquire[s] jurisdic-
tion of a cause for any purpose, it should dispose of the entire controversy and
its incidents, and not remit any part of it to a court of law." Greene v. Louis-
ville & I.R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 520 (1917); see DE FUNIAK, supra note 35, § 99. For
instance, an action for an injunction accompanied by a request for a money
judgment presents both equitable and legal claims. Once equity acquired juris-
diction over the action to decide the injunction claim, the chancellor had dis-
cretion to decide factual questions related to the legal request for a money
judgment, including the actual amount of the award. SUIT AT COMMON LAW,
supra note 26, at 19.
49. FRIEDENTHAL Err AL., supra note 21, § 11.5; see NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937); 5 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MooR's
FEDERAL PRACtiCE % 38.25 (1988).
50. 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 49, 1 38.03.
51. 359 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1959). In Beacon, the Court concluded that,
under the new Federal Rules and the Declaratory Judgment Act, the plaintiff
had an adequate remedy at law. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a
jury trial on the legal treble damages issue. IH at 507.
52. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
53. Id. at 470; see also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REME-
DIES § 2.6 (1973) (stating that under Dairy Queen, incidental jurisdiction theo-
ries would not support the denial of a jury trial); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 21, § 11.5 ('"The opinion in Dairy Queen made it clear that virtually no
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ply the doctrine in recent cases reflects its desire to restrict the
doctrine as an outdated procedural device.54
application of the clean-up doctrine was constitutionally acceptable."); Redish,
supra note 21, at 497 (noting that the rejection in Dairy Queen of the clean-up
doctrine contrasted sharply with historical practice).
54. See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1348 (1990);
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1987). In Tull, the Government
sought civil damages from a developer for violations of the Clean Water Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of the developer's de-
mand for a jury trial. The Court acknowledged that a court in equity had the
power to provide monetary relief "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive
relief." 481 U.S. at 424. The Court did not apply the clean-up doctrine in Tull,
however, because it did not view the potential penalty of $22 million as inci-
dental to the modest injunctive relief the plaintiff sought. Id The defendant
in Tull had already sold most of the property at issue in the case. Therefore,
any relief enjoining the defendant's activities would be minimal. The govern-
ment thus knew when it filed suit that relief would be limited primarily to
civil penalties. Id. at 424-25. The Court also refused to apply the doctrine
when the violated statute did not intertwine equitable relief and traditionally
legal damages. Id. at 425. The Court applied a similar test in Terry, 110 S. Ct.
at 1348 (holding that because employees in an action alleging the breach of
duty of fair representation sought only money damages, without incidental in-
junctive relief, the remedy was legal).
It is unclear under what circumstances the Court will uphold application
of the doctrine. At the very least, Tull requires that the claims for equitable
relief and legal damages be truly intertwined, rather than simply related to
one another, and that the legal claim be the minor, or subordinate, of the two
remedies. 481 U.S. at 424-25. In addition, a court in equity may not enforce
civil penalties as incidental to injunctive relief. Id. at 424. Also, under Terry,
if no party raises an equitable claim, the doctrine cannot apply. 110 S. Ct. at
1339. Finally, the Court has endorsed a "necessity" rule, stating that when
both legal and equitable issues are presented in the same case, "only under the
most imperative circumstances ... can the right to a jury trial of legal issues
be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
Federal district and circuit courts have nonetheless proved unwilling to
dispense with the equitable clean-up doctrine. Especially in statutory civil
rights actions, several courts have denied jury trials on damages claims charac-
terized as "an integral part of" or "incidental to" the equitable remedy of rein-
statement. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1122 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607 F.2d 1194, 1196
(7th Cir. 1979); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir.
1970) (treating a money claim for back pay for wrongfully discharged teachers
as merely incidental to an equitable claim for reinstatement), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 991 (1971); cf. Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.) (hold-
ing that the award and amount of front pay "as an adjunct or an alternative to




I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL ON FRONT PAY UNDER THE
ADEA
Consistent with the Seventh Amendment, courts have uni-
formly interpreted the 1978 jury trial amendment to the ADEA
as granting the right to a jury trial on legal issues arising under
the ADEA but not on equitable issues.5 Courts also agree that
the judge should decide whether to grant reinstatement or
front pay depending on the circumstances of each case.- They
have disagreed, however, about whether the calculation of
front pay presents a "legal" or an "equitable" issue, the crucial
distinction for determinations under the Seventh Amend-
ment.57 As a result, while some courts have reserved the calcu-
lation of front pay for the judge sitting in equity,-s others have
delegated the question to the jury.59
Those courts that recognize the right to jury computation
of front pay generally have not articulated the reasons for this
approach. Some opinions conclude that the calculation of front
pay is within the competence of the jury,60 or that the presence
55. See, ag., Duke, 928 F.2d at 1422; Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
822 F.2d 1249,1257 (2d Cir. 1987); Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp.
48, 51 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
56. Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 823 (5th Cir. 1990) ("All cir-
cuit courts that have considered the issue ... agree that ... the district court
must determine whether an employee can be reinstated or is entitled to front
pay.").
57. Several courts have distinguished the issue of the calculation of front
pay from the issue of the propriety of reinstatement or front pay in a given
case. E.g., id, ("[The circuits are split on the issue of whether a jury or the
trial court is to determine the proper amount of ADEA front pay."); see also
Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985) (distinguishing the
decision about whether to award front pay from the computation of the
award), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Eivins v. Adventist Health Sys., E. &
Middle America, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1255,1261 (D. Kan. 1987) (stating that while
the court decides whether to award front pay, the jury decides the amount of
front pay).
58. See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1991); Duke,
928 F.2d at 1424.
59. See, eg., Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 892-93
(6th Cir. 1988).
60. See, ag., Cassino v. Reichold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir.
1987) ("[IThe effect of inflation and interest rates on the value of money is
within the common knowledge of jurors ... and jurors are sufficiently intelli-
gent to reduce an award to present value."), cerL denied, 489 U.S. 1047 (1988).
In the context of Title VII, one trial court noted in dicta that the loss of future
earnings constitutes the kind of damages regularly submitted to a jury for res-




of the front pay issue does not interfere with the jury's ability
to return a fair verdict.61 One circuit court noted that awards
for future earnings resulting from a discriminatory discharge
are no more speculative than similar awards routinely made by
juries in personal injury cases.62 Most courts permitting jury
computation of front pay, however, state that the amount of
damages is a question for the jury without explaining the rea-
sons for their decision.63 Some opinions simply cite a prior case
in which the appellate court affirmed the amount of a jury ver-
dict of front pay without addressing whether the judge or jury
should calculate front pay awards.6
Courts that refuse to submit the issue of front pay to the
jury or that submit it to the jury on an advisory basis only jus-
tify this approach on several grounds. Most of these courts
identify front pay as a substitute for reinstatement under the
ADEA.6 5 These courts conclude that because reinstatement is
an equitable remedy not giving rise to the right to a jury trial,
the substitute or adjunctive remedy of front pay should simi-
larly be determined by the court.6 In the recent case of For-
61. Eivins, 660 F. Supp. at 1261.
62. Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1057 (1986) (stating that the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages in
age discrimination cases should effectively limit unjustified damage awards).
63. See, e.g., Fite, 861 F.2d at 893 ("[Defendantl's contention that front pay
is not a question for the jury is at odds with the authority of this circuit.");
Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1333 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Author-
ity and reason both suggest that.., the amount of damages available is a jury
question."), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988).
64. E.g., Fite, 861 F.2d at 892-93 (citing Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc.,
742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984)); Eivins, 660 F. Supp. at 1261 (citing Davis, 742
F.2d at 922 & n.5).
65. E.g., Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 824 (5th Cir. 1990);
EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Stafford v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 741 F.
Supp. 664, 666 (E.D. Mich. 1990). For a thorough discussion of front pay as a
substitute for reinstatement, see Janovsky, supra note 4. One rationale for al-
lowing front pay only as a substitute for reinstatement is that, while the
ADEA does not explicitly mention front pay, the Act does authorize courts to
order reinstatement. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1317 (N.D. Ill.
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). For this reason, and
because where practicable reinstatement is more likely to effectuate the
"make-whole" purpose of the Act, the courts have preferred reinstatement to
front pay. See, e.g., Reneau v. Wayne Griffin & Sons, 945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th
Cir. 1991); Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir. 1990); Whit-
tlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984). This view also
finds support in the Act itself, which seeks to "promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988) (em-
phasis added).
66. See, e.g., Stafford, 741 F. Supp. at 666; see also Deloach, 897 F.2d at 824
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tino v. Quasar Co.,67 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit used
this reasoning. Judge Posner relied on an equity court's power
under the clean-up doctrine "to make an award of damages in
substitution for an equitable remedy."' 6 Another recent case
implicitly applied the clean-up doctrine, citing dicta in Supreme
Court opinions stating that courts may decide legal issues that
are "incidental" or "adjunctive" to equitable remedies. 69
Courts also follow the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co.70 Having earlier held that
front pay is an equitable remedy because it is in lieu of rein-
statement,71 the Second Circuit stated in Dominic that permit-
ting the judge to decide whether front pay is an appropriate
remedy while allowing the jury to decide the amount of front
pay could result in an inconsistent decision.72 As an example,
the court noted that, while the jury could find that the dis-
charged employee would never find other work and thus return
a large verdict for front pay, the judge could conclude that the
employee would find work immediately and therefore that no
award was appropriate.73
Some courts reserve the computation of front pay under
the ADEA primarily because of the many factors that must be
considered in determining the amount of the award.74 In the
only circuit court opinion to identify the Seventh Amendment
as the basis of a party's demand for a jury trial, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated in Duke v. Uniroya4 Inc. that the variety of possible
factual circumstances rendered front pay an equitable rem-
(concluding that front pay is an equitable remedy after noting that it is
awarded in lieu of the equitable remedy of reinstatement).
67. 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
68. IML at 398.
69. Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.) (stating that "as
an adjunct or an alternative to reinstatement," the award and the amount of
front pay rests in the discretion of the court), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 429
(1991).
70. 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1987). Cases in which the court relied on the
reasoning in Dominic include Fortino, 950 F.2d at 398; Denison v. Swaco Geo-
lograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir. 1991); Stafford, 741 F. Supp. at 666-
67.
71. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984).
72. Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257.
73. Id.
74. See Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 429 (1991); Stafford, 741 F. Supp. at 667; Chace v. Champion Plug
Co., 725 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Md. 1989); c. Reneau v. Wayne Griffin & Sons,
945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that because calculations of front pay
are speculative, "the courts must employ intelligent guesswork").
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edy.75 The court did not apply both prongs of the Seventh
Amendment analysis. Its inquiry into the legal or equitable na-
ture of front pay resembles the second prong of the Seventh
Amendment test, but the court did not discuss the first prong.
The court stated that the "difficult question" of providing relief
for potential future losses "requires an analysis of all the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of trial."7 6 The court concluded
that the complex and discretionary nature of such a broad in-
quiry makes front pay similar to restitution. It therefore de-
nied the right to a jury trial on front pay, relying on a Supreme
Court statement that money damages as restitution may be a
form of equitable relief.77
Uncertainty about whether the jury or the court should de-
termine front pay damages makes it more difficult for ADEA
litigants to evaluate the settlement value of their claims. In a
larger sense, the uncertainty raises important questions about
the priority of the "inviolate"7 8 right to trial by jury.
IV. THE RIGHT TO JURY COMPUTATION
OF FRONT PAY
Courts should interpret the ADEA to provide for jury com-
putation of front pay because that is what Congress intended,
and because the Seventh Amendment requires them to do so.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO COMPLY WITH THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
In the legislative history of the 1978 jury trial amendment,
Congress alluded to the distinction between legal and equitable
remedies and the significance of that distinction for the right to
a jury trial. The Conference Report stated that "[it is] manifest
that a party is entitled to have the factual issues underlying...
a claim [for legal relief] decided by a jury."79 Senator Kennedy
made a similar statement on the Senate floor.8 0
75. Duke, 928 F.2d at 1424.
76. Id at 1423.
77. Id- at 1424 (citing Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339,
1348 (1990)).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a). "Inviolate" is synonymous with "unprofaned."
Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 638 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (stat-
ing that the term's use in this context confers a degree of sanctity on the right
to trial by jury).
79. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note 10, at 14, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 535.
80. See 123 CONG. REc. 34,317 (1977).
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As the Supreme Court noted in Lorillard v. Pons, the word
"legal" is a term of art referring to those claims on which the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides the right to a jury trial.8 ' When Congress uses terms in a
statute that have a specific meaning in the law, "'they are pre-
sumed to have been used in that sense unless the context com-
pels to the contrary.' "82
Although Congress's attention to the law-equity distinction
is not conclusive concerning front pay, it at least suggests an in-
tent to comply with the Seventh Amendment by providing the
right to a jury trial on legal issues.8 3 Courts addressing the is-
sue of congressional intent have reached the same conclusion.8
If computation of front pay is a legal issue according to the con-
stitutional test, interpreting the ADEA as granting the right to
a jury trial on front pay honors Congress's apparent intent with
respect to the Seventh Amendment.
B. FRONT PAY AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Under Seventh Amendment analysis, computation of front
pay presents a legal issue on which either party is entitled to a
jury trial. As is required by the first prong of the Court's Sev-
81. 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978).
82. Id. (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911)).
83. Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1987).
84. See cases cited supra note 55. Some commentators have stated that
the amendment entitles each party in a case arising under the Act to a jury
trial on any factual question regardless of whether the type of relief is charac-.
terized as legal or equitable. See, e.g., Edward T. O'Donnell et al., The Federal
Age Discrimination Statute: Basic Law, Areas of Controversy, and Sugges-
tions for Compliance, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 25 (1979). In Dominic, how-
ever, the court, citing the Conference Report's discussion of § 626(c)(2),
concluded that the amendment simply effectuated congressional compliance
with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on factual issues underlying
legal claims. 822 F.2d at 1257. The Dominic court's analysis accurately re-
flects the consensus that the Seventh Amendment preserves only the right to
a jury trial on legal issues. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33, 41 (1989). Although courts recognize no constitutional right to a jury trial
on equitable issues, they will enforce a statutory right to a jury trial on equita-
ble issues where Congress has so provided. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra
note 21, § 11.6.
The House Conference Report also supports the Dominic court's analysis,
describing the Senate version of the amendment as providing the "right to a
jury trial if the action involves monetary damages, whether or not equitable
relief is sought by any party in the same action." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950,
supra note 10, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 535. This language sug-
gests that the final version of the amendment provides the right to a jury trial
on legal issues only. This interpretation of the amendment also follows from
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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enth Amendment test, there is a common law analogue for a
claim for front pay under the ADEA. Moreover, front pay re-
sembles the kind of remedy typically awarded in the courts of
law. In addition, neither a complexity exception nor the equita-
ble clean-up doctrine justify denying the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial on front pay.
1. Breach of Contract as a Common Law Analogue to an
ADEA Claim for Front Pay
A suit for front pay under the ADEA resembles the com-
mon law action of breach of contract for wrongful discharge. In
breach of contract actions, the courts of law settled claims
analogous to those brought by employees aggrieved under the
Act.8 5
In wrongful discharge actions, discharged employees
treated their contracts as continuing and sued their employers
for the breach. The action permitted the employees to recover
damages for lost wages caused by their employers' breach. 86
The employees, however, were required to mitigate damages to
prevent a windfall.8 7 In an action for wrongful discharge at
common law, the plaintiff could sue for termination of employ-
ment before the end of the contract term.88 The amount the
employee would have earned had there been no breach, less
any mitigation deduction, formed the measure of the em-
ployee's damages.8 9 Juries typically calculated damages in
breach of contract actions.9
85. In Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1991), Judge Pos-
ner, discussing the availability of a jury trial on front pay under the ADEA,
noted that "front pay resembles common law damages for breach of an em-
ployment contract." A similar analogy has been drawn in actions under Title
VII. See Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 919 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
86. Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 918.
87. Id-
88. 1 AUSTIN ABBOTT & CARLOS C. ALDEN, FORMS OF PLEADING IN Ac-
TIONS FOR LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RELIEF 656-58 (2d ed. 1918); CHARLES T. Mc-
CoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 161 (1935). McCormick
wrote:
The plaintiff need not wait until the term of his employment has ex-
pired before suing for entire damages for wrongful discharge. Accord-
ing to the majority and sounder view, if the action is tried before the
term of hiring has ended, the plaintiff may recover not only for the
loss of earnings already accrued, but for the prospective loss for the
unexpired period.
Id
89. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1358
(3d ed. 1968).
90. Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 918; see MCCORMICK, supra note 88, § 162
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In an action for front pay under the ADEA, the employer's
breach of duty gives rise to the employee's right to recover
damages for wrongful discharge. As in the common law breach
of contract action, an ADEA plaintiff's duty to mitigate dam-
ages may limit the amount of recovery.91 The duty to mitigate
is fundamental to the law of contracts and peculiar to legal, as
opposed to equitable, actions.92 Also, like the plaintiff in the
common law action, an ADEA plaintiff claiming front pay
seeks damages for lost wages past the date of discharge.93
A court of law in 1791 would likely have heard a claim for
front pay for discriminatory discharge had such a cause of ac-
tion then existed. Although an action for front pay may also
resemble historically equitable actions, the Supreme Court indi-
cated in Tull v. United States that the existence of a common
law analogue sufficed for the purposes of the Seventh Amend-
ment.9 In Tull, the Court found appropriate analogies to the
modern suit in eighteenth-century legal and equitable actions.95
The Court stated that it "need not decide the question" of
which action served as a better analogy, and proceeded to the
second prong of its Seventh Amendment analysis.96
("[Tihe jury should be instructed to give only the present worth... of the
amounts to be awarded for the future loss of earnings." (emphasis added)).
91. See, e.g., Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir. 1990);
Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 708-09 (3d Cir. 1990).
92. KALET, supra note 2, at 101-04. McCormick described the plaintiffs'
"duty to mitigate" in legal damages actions:
Where one person has committed a tort, breach of contract, or other
legal wrong against another, it is incumbent upon the latter to use
such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or
minimize the damages. The person wronged cannot recover for any
item of damage which could thus have been avoided.
MCCORMICK, supra note 88, § 33.
93. The only significant difference between the modern and common law
actions is that the common law enforced express promises by the employer,
whereas the ADEA enforces implied statutory obligations. Whether express
or implied, however, the common contractual element of the employment re-
lationship renders a claim for front pay after a discriminatory discharge suffi-
ciently analogous to a legal breach of contract action. See supra note 22
(discussing the Seventh Amendment test's requirement of "resemblance" to
satisfy the search for a common law analogue). The early case of United
States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23 (C.C.D. Va. 1795) (No. 15,834), employed a sim-
ilar analysis. In Mundell, the court drew an analogy between a statutory ac-
tion for damages and the common law action for debt. The court noted that
"Whatever... the laws order any one to pay, that instantly becomes a debt
which he hath beforehand contracted to discharge." Id- at 28.
94. 481 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1987).




2. The Legal Remedy of Front Pay
Under the second prong of the Seventh Amendment test,
courts consider the legal or equitable nature of the remedy
sought. This inquiry does not merely replicate the historical in-
quiry of the first prong, courts may consider the general nature
of legal and equitable relief, especially in light of the expansion
of legal remedies after the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
a. Monetary Damages as Legal Relief
Measured as the present value of future income the plain-
tiff would have earned in the defendant's employ less the miti-
gation deduction,9 ' the amount of a front pay award reflects the
monetary value of the harm resulting from the employer's dis-
crimination. Common law courts characterized monetary dam-
ages measured by the harm to the plaintiff as a legal remedy.
98
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the legal character of money
damages in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.9 The plaintiffs in
Dairy Queen sought to enjoin the defendant from using the
Dairy Queen trademark and collecting money from stores car-
rying the corporate trademark after the defendant defaulted on
a contract for a Dairy Queen franchise.1l ° Dairy Queen's par-
ent corporation also sought an accounting, a traditional remedy
in equity,10 1 to determine how much the defendant owed for
breach of contract and trademark infringement.1 0 2 Wood de-
manded a jury trial on the factual issues relating to those
97. See Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir. 1990) (em-
ploying this definition).
98. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (stating that money
damages were "the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law"); see
also Schneider, supra note 26, at 201 ("The distinctive feature of a 'legal issue'
for seventh amendment purposes is its presence in a claim for money dam-
ages."). The term "damages" usually refers to a recovery measured by the
plaintiff's losses. In contrast, "restitution" usually describes a recovery mea-
sured by the defendant's gains. DoBBs, supra note 53, § 4.5. Equity courts had
independent jurisdiction to award money as restitution, but only to restore the
status quo or to correct unjust enrichment. 5 MoORE ET AL., supra note 49, %
38.24; see also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946) (defining
"restitution" as "restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that
which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant").
99. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
100. Id at 475.
101. An "action for an accounting" involved a suit in which the compli-
cated character of the accounts rendered the remedy at law inadequate and
therefore gave rise to equity jurisdiction. DE FuNIAX, supra note 35, § 103 n.2.
102. 369 U.S. at 475.
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claims.'03 The Court held that the plaintiffs' "unquestionably
legal" claim for a money judgment gave rise to the right to a
jury trial.1 4 This holding led some commentators to conclude
that after Dairy Queen any claim for a money judgment consti-
tutes a legal claim triable to a jury. 0 5
In the recent case of Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, °6
the Court clarified, in dicta, the holding of Dairy Queen. The
Court stated that a judge may, without a jury, grant monetary
relief as restitution to disgorge improper profits. 0 7 The Terry
Court also stated that a court may grant money damages that
are "'incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief.' "108
Terry emphasized that these situations are limited exceptions
to the rule that monetary damages are "'the traditional form of
relief offered in the courts of law.' 109 The Court found that
neither of the exceptions applied on the facts of Terry,"0 indi-
cating that the Court prefers trial by jury of issues relating to
monetary awards.
Under the rule of Dairy Queen, a monetary award such as
front pay is a legal remedy on which either party is entitled to
a jury trial."' Some lower courts, however, have concluded
that the restitutionary and discretionary nature of front pay
makes the remedy an equitable one." 2 Others have contended
that because the computation of front pay is complex, and be-
103. Id. at 476.
104. Id. at 476-77 ("As an action on a debt allegedly due under a contract, it
would be difficult to conceive of an action of a more traditionally legal
character.").
105. See, eg., DOBBS, supra note 53, § 2.6; Erica B. Clements, United States
v. Tull: The Right to Jury Trial Under the Clean Water Act-The Jury is Still
Out, 41 U. MLAm L. REv. 665, 676 (1987).
106. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
107. Id. at 1348.
108. Id (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987)).
109. Id. at 1347 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)). In
Curtis, the plaintiff sued for violations of the fair housing provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The jury awarded punitive damages under the Act,
and on appeal the Supreme Court held in an action for damages under the Act
that the Seventh Amendment entitled either party to a jury trial on demand.
415 U.S. at 195. The Court's holding rested in part upon the conclusion that
monetary damages constituted a traditionally legal remedy. Id. at 196.
110. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1348-49.
111. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196.
112. See Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 429 (1991); cf. Stafford v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 741 F. Supp.
664, 666 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (" 'An award of front pay must be governed by the
sound discretion of the trial court and may not be appropriate in all cases




cause front pay is "incidental" to the remedy of reinstatement,
courts are better suited to decide the amount of front pay
awards. 113
b. Front Pay is Not a Form of Restitution
Courts that have identified front pay as a form of restitu-
tion, and therefore an equitable remedy, have mischaracterized
the nature of front pay. Restitution seeks to "disgorge funds
wrongfully withheld"'114 and thus correct unjust enrichment." 5
Restitution is typically measured by the defendant's unjust gain
rather than by the plaintiff's harm.116 Instead of disgorging
employers' unjust enrichment, however, front pay awards com-
pensate employees for salary they would have earned but for
their employers' discrimination. In other words, a front pay
award represents damages measured by the plaintiff's harm
rather than by the defendant's gain. The employee's duty to
mitigate underscores this distinction. A discriminatory dis-
charge will not result in future unjust enrichment because the
employer has lost the value of the employee's services. When
courts grant a monetary award such as front pay in the absence
of or in an amount greater than any unjust enrichment, the
remedy is not restitutionary.
Similarly, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc.,117 the discretionary nature of front pay
does not render the remedy restitutionary. The Duke court
equated "discretionary" and "restitutionary," apparently be-
113. E.g., Duke, 928 F.2d at 1423 (stating that the many factors that go into
calculating the amount of a front pay award make it appropriate for a judge to
determine the amount); Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 824 (5th Cir.
1990) (concluding that front pay is an equitable remedy because it is in lieu of
reinstatement).
114. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.
115. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) ("A person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to
the other."). The Restatement describes the forms of equitable restitution as
limited to constructive trusts, equitable liens, and subrogation. ICE § 160. As
the Restatement indicates, because an order for restitution can involve equita-
ble enforcement, restitution in some forms is properly considered an equitable
remedy. Restitution, however, developed at both law and equity. GEORGE E.
PALMER, THE LAW OF RFsTrrUTION § 1.1 (1978).
116. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a (1937) ("Ordinarily, the
measure of restitution is the amount of enrichment received .... "); DOBBS,
supra note 53, § 2.6 n.42 (defining "restitution" as a "recovery measured by the
defendant's gains" and "damages" as a "recovery measured by the plaintiff's
losses").
117. 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991).
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cause trial judges have broad discretion in providing equitable
remedies such as restitution.1'8 While restitution may lie in the
court's discretion, for a remedy to be characterized as "restitu-
tion" it must be more than merely within the judge's discretion.
If the remedy fails to disgorge unjust enrichment or restore the
status quo, no amount of discretion will make the remedy
restitutionary.
Moreover, even if front pay were restitutionary, it would
not necessarily be an equitable remedy. Restitution developed
both at law and equity; the primary difference was the rem-
edy's form.1' 9 Hence, the conclusion that if front pay is restitu-
tionary it is necessarily an equitable remedy conflicts with the
historical concept of restitution. This reasoning obscures the
Seventh Amendment test's inquiry into the nature of the
remedy.
c. Discretion Does Not Render Front Pay an Equitable
Remedy
Some courts imply that front pay is an equitable remedy
because the decision to award front pay in lieu of reinstatement
rests in the trial court's discretion. 20 The view that discretion-
ary matters arise solely in equity probably derives from the
principle that a court sitting in equity has traditionally had
great discretion over equitable remedies.' 12 Historically, how-
ever, the discretionary nature of a remedy had no bearing on its
characterization as legal or equitable. In various instances at
118. The Duke court cited as authority for its approach the reasoning of
the courts of appeals concerning awards of back pay under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id The court erred in importing the reasoning ap-
plied to back pay awards under Title VII. The Supreme Court expressly
noted, in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978), that the remedial and pro-
cedural provisions of Title VII and the ADEA differ significantly with respect
to the statutory right to a jury trial. These differences led the Court to find
the defendant's analogy between the two acts on the jury trial issue "unavail-
ing." Id
119. Common law courts addressed unjust enrichment through the action
of quasi-contract, which called for legal restitution in the form of a simple
money judgment. PALMER, supra note 115, § 1.2. Equity enforced restitution
through constructive trusts, equitable liens, and subrogation. RESTATEMENT OF
REsTITUTION § 160 (1937).
120. See Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 824 (5th Cir. 1990); Staf-
ford v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 741 F. Supp. 664, 666 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
121. WALSH, supra note 35, § 8. As Walsh notes, early decisions at equity
relied less on precedent than on the chancellor's personal view of right and
wrong. This lack of fixed principles led to the cynical suggestion that the




common law, juries had considerable discretion in granting
damage awards. For example, a jury could choose whether to
award punitive damages122 and whether to allow interest on a
damage award.1-s At least in the case of punitive damages,
modern courts continue to interpret statutes as vesting juries
with discretion to decide whether to make monetary awards
and in what amount. 24 Therefore, while all equitable remedies
may be discretionary, not all discretionary remedies are equita-
ble. Specifically, the discretionary nature of front pay does not
necessarily make front pay an equitable remedy.
The remedial language of the ADEA also refutes the argu-
ment that discretionary relief must be equitable. The Act
grants the judge discretion to afford appropriate legal or equita-
ble relief to carry out the ADEA's purposes.us To treat all dis-
cretionary relief as equitable therefore frustrates the statute's
plain meaning. Unless the language permitting a judge to grant
"appropriate... legal relief" has no meaning, Congress's grant
of discretion to courts to choose between various legal and equi-
table remedies must indicate that not all discretionary remedies
are equitable. In deciding whether to allow the jury to award
front pay in any given case, the judge simply exercises the au-
thority to decide matters of law. The question of law before the
court is whether an award of front pay, as computed by the
jury, would "effectuate the purposes of [the Act]."'126
Unlike restitution, front pay does not disgorge the defend-
ant's unjust enrichment, but instead remedies the plaintiff's fu-
122. McCoRMICK, supra note 88, § 84.
123. 1id. § 56.
124. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that juries may
award punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Davis v. Mason County, 927
F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 275 (1991) . But see
Schneider, supra note 26, at 160-84 (discussing a court trend to shift discretion-
ary control over damages from the jury to the judge).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). Under the statute's literal language, the
judge may determine the propriety of front pay depending on the facts of a
given case. Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir.
1984); rf Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987)
(stating that trial courts have discretion on whether to award front pay in lieu
of reinstatement), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988). For example, judges have
the discretion to deny an award of front pay when they order a plaintiff rein-
stated. To permit an award of front pay in addition to reinstatement would
allow a double recovery. Similarly, a judge could deny an award of front pay
where the remedy would be so speculative as to render any monetary award
indeterminate. See Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (6th
Cir. 1985). This judicial gatekeeping function ensures that juries award front
pay only when to do so would serve the purposes of the ADEA.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
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ture injury. According to the Supreme Court, damages
measured by the plaintiff's harm are a typical form of legal re-
lief. Moreover, the discretion courts have in awarding front pay
does not render the remedy equitable, because the ADEA ex-
pressly gives judges discretion to grant or deny legal relief.
Under the nature of the remedy prong of the Seventh Amend-
ment test, courts should characterize front pay as a legal
remedy.
3. Complexity and the Practical Limitations of the Jury
Reliance on a complexity exception to the Seventh Amend-
ment to deny a jury trial on the amount of front pay comports
neither with Supreme Court precedent nor with common sense.
The courts' assertion that the multiple factors involved in com-
puting front pay render it too complex for a jury directly con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's holding in Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood.' 7 According to Dairy Queen, the jury should decide
even complex legal issues, with assistance from a court-ap-
pointed master when necessary. The "complexity" of calculat-
ing lost future wages or applying discount tables to ADEA
front pay awards cannot justify dispensing with the jury on
these issues. 2
Moreover, an award of front pay represents the kind of
127. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
128. In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Supreme Court dis-
cussed whether the Seventh Amendment provided the right to a jury assess-
ment of civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. The Court stated, "In this
case, highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple factors
are necessary in order to set civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. These
are the kinds of calculations traditionally performed by judges." Id. at 427 (cit-
ing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 442-43 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)). The Court reasoned, however, that Congress intended trial
judges to perform the calculations in actions under the Clean Water Act. I&L
at 425; see also 123 CONG. REC. 39,190-91 (1977) (citing a letter from EPA assis-
tant administrators of enforcement which discussed "penalties assessed by
judges"). The Court concluded that Congress can, consistent with the Seventh
Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil penalties. The assessment of civil
penalties, the Court noted, is not one of the "most fundamental elements" of
the institution of the jury trial, especially because an action for civil penalties
usually seeks the amount fixed by Congress. Tull, 481 U.S. at 427.
In contrast, with respect to the ADEA, Congress evinced no intent to au-
thorize judges to calculate front pay awards. Furthermore, the purpose of the
civil penalty differs significantly from the purpose of an award of front pay.
The Court's holding in Tull should not be read to extinguish the established
right to a jury trial on legal damages issues in civil trials. For a thorough anal-
ysis of jury assessment of damages and a critique of Tull's "fundamental ele-
ment" approach, see Schneider, supra note 26.
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damages that juries regularly compute. For instance, juries
routinely determine lost future wages and benefits in personal
injury actions.129 Issues of lost wages, life expectancy, and fu-
ture earning ability differ little between tort cases and employ-
ment discrimination cases. Similarly, juries regularly compute
future damages in breach of contract actions, 3 0 which, as noted
above, are analogous to claims for front pay under the ADEA.
The long-standing tradition of reliance on juries to determine
future damages refutes the claim that juries are not competent
to calculate front pay in actions for discriminatory discharge.
Some courts suggest that the speculative nature of front
pay makes computation too complex for the jury.13 ' In most
cases of age discrimination, however, the short period covered
by the award of front pay simplifies its calculation. 132 In cases
involving younger plaintiffs, the court may instruct jurors on
the plaintiffs' duty to mitigate damages. To reduce the uncer-
tainty about what the plaintiffs' future wages and benefits
would have been had the discrimination not occurred, person-
nel experts can testify about the likelihood of promotion, lay-
off, termination, and other changes that would affect the front
pay award13s In addition, if the speculative nature of the em-
ployee's injury would render any award of front pay absolutely
indeterminate, the trial judge has discretion not to grant an
129. McCoRMICK, supra note 88, § 86 ("In cases of serious injuries, the
award for impairment of future earning capacity is usually the major part of
the recovery and is the source of the most difficulty in proof by the plaintiff
and in evaluation by the jury." (emphasis added)).
130. See Roger J. McClow, Labor Law and Unemployment Compensation,
35 WAYNE L. REV. 769, 782 (1989).
131. See, e.g., Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1423 (4th Cir.) (stating
that "the appropriate method for addressing the difficult question... requires
an analysis of all the circumstances existing at the time of trial"), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 429 (1991).
132. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1318-19 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). An award of front pay will
cover only the years the employee would have continued working for the em-
ployer. Therefore, the closer to retirement the average ADEA plaintiff is, the
shorter the average duration of front pay awards will be. An analysis of
ADEA cases reported in 1982 and 1983 revealed that the average age of an em-
ployee bringing suit in those years was 55.8. Average Employee Claiming Age
Bias is Profiled, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Jan. 13, 1984, at A18, A18.
133. See Eivins v. Adventist Health Sys., E. & Middle America, Inc., 660 F.
Supp. 1255, 1261 (D. Kan. 1987). In Eivins, the defendant moved for a new
trial on the grounds that the trial court had impermissibly admitted expert
testimony on future lost wages and benefits. Id The trial court denied the de-




The nature of front pay may cause concern about specula-
tive damage awards. Nonetheless, careful instructions to a jury
that has received helpful testimony can reduce speculative ver-
dicts while leaving intact the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial.
4. Front Pay and the Equitable Clean-Up Doctrine
In several ADEA cases, courts have held that because front
pay is available only "in lieu of reinstatement," the remedy is
equitable and therefore that calculation of the award should be
left to the court.135 Courts that have denied a jury trial on
front pay issues because front pay is an alternative to reinstate-
ment have applied faulty reasoning. Under the clean-up doc-
trine, a legal issue was not transformed into an equitable one
merely because the court of equity considered it as an incident
to an equitable issue.'3 5 That nexus merely permitted a court
of equity to decide incidental issues despite their classification
as legal. Whether or not front pay is "incidental" to the rem-
edy of reinstatement, front pay itself remains a legal issue.
Courts that have mistakenly used the clean-up doctrine to
label front pay as an equitable remedy have avoided the tension
inherent in keeping an admittedly legal issue from the jury's
reach. They have skirted the critical issues that each modern
application of the clean-up doctrine should raise, that is,
whether the equitable clean-up doctrine still serves the func-
tions it served before the merger of law and equity, and under
what circumstances the Seventh Amendment permits contin-
ued application of the clean-up doctrine.
There remains little justification for the use of the equita-
ble clean-up doctrine after the merger of law and equity. Be-
cause a single civil action provides the forum for both legal and
equitable issues, modern procedure adequately addresses the
concerns of efficiency and fairness that once justified the doc-
134. Fortino, 751 F. Supp. at 1318. Courts may also alleviate the specula-
tive nature of front pay awards by ensuring that the jury considers such fac-
tors as the employee's duty to mitigate, the availability of alternative
employment, the employee's life and work expectancies, and the tables dis-
counting an award to present value. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
135. See, e.g., Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1991).
136. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52 (1989) ("'[L]egal
claims are not magically converted into equitable issues by their presentation
to a court of equity."' (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970))).
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trine. The Supreme Court recognizes that the clean-up doc-
trine has at most a limited place in a merged system.137 Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood indi-
cate the Court's preference for having juries resolve legal issues
rather than having courts decide them through incidental juris-
diction. Even in recent cases in which the Court purported to
acknowledge the continuing validity of the doctrine, it refused
to apply it.'- Where, in an ADEA action, the judge and jury
can discharge their respective duties without serious ineffi-
ciency or unfairness, they should do so in deference to the Sev-
enth Amendment preference for the jury trial on legal
issues.139
Moreover, courts should not apply the clean-up doctrine
for purposes other than those that historically justified its use.
Equity's discretionary jurisdiction over incidental legal claims
economized litigation by permitting one court to resolve legal
and equitable issues presented in the same action. Clean-up ju-
risdiction did not, in 1791, arise out of a concern that the
awards of judges and juries might conflict or that juries might
make speculative damage awards. Nonetheless, courts that
have relied on the clean-up doctrine in ADEA cases have justi-
fied their reliance on these grounds.14° This broad extension of
incidental jurisdiction is not justified in light of the Supreme
Court's apparent disdain for the equitable clean-up doctrine.
Neither the clean-up doctrine nor a complexity exception
can justify taking from the jury what the Seventh Amendment
analysis indicates is a legal issue. Permitting juries to compute
front pay damages under the ADEA preserves the constitu-
tional right to a jury trial on legal issues.
C. FRONT PAY AS "AMOUNTS OWING" UNDER THE ADEA
Even if the legal or equitable nature of front pay were un-
certain, to construe the ADEA as granting the right to a jury
trial on front pay serves an established rule of statutory con-
137. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471 (1962).
138. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990); Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
139. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1344-45 ("'Maintenance of the jury as a fact-
finding body is of such importance ... that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."' (quoting
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959))).
140. E.g., Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1426 (10th Cir.




struction. The Supreme Court has affirmed the "cardinal prin-
ciple" that courts should "'first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitu-
tional] question may be avoided."'141 By finding the right to a
jury trial on front pay in the statute itself, courts may avoid
facing the question of whether the Seventh Amendment pro-
vides such a right.
The ADEA readily permits such an interpretation. In 1978,
Congress amended the ADEA to provide for a jury trial "of any
issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing
as a result of a violation of this Act, regardless of whether equi-
table relief is sought by any party in such action."'1 The Con-
ference Committee Report on the 1978 Amendments defined
"amounts owing" to the victims of a discriminatory discharge in
violation of the ADEA as "includ[ing] items of pecuniary or
economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-related bene-
fits."'143 The elements described as comprising "amounts ow-
ing" under the Act coincide exactly with those that make up an
award of front pay.
Many courts have read "amounts owing" to exclude pro-
spective damages.14 This interpretation of the term "owing"
finds little support in the law of damages. In a tort or breach of
contract action, for example, courts deem awards representing
damages past the date of trial as nonetheless presently ow-
ing.'4 The analogy between an ADEA action for front pay and
a breach of contract action for wrongful discharge supports in-
terpreting "amounts owing" under the ADEA to include
awards of front pay. Moreover, neither the Act nor the Confer-
ence Report expressly excludes prospective damages from
"amounts owing."'41 Because the computation of front pay
141. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1344 n.3 (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971)).
142. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 190 (1978) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988)).
143. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, supra note 10, at 14, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 535.
144. See, e.g., Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1989); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1317 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). Without directly addressing the
issue, other courts have implicitly excluded front pay from "amounts owing"
by concluding that there is no statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial
on front pay. If these courts had found that "amounts owing" included front
pay awards, they necessarily would have found a statutory right to a jury trial
on front pay.
145. See McCORMICK, supra note 88, § 161.
146. The Second Circuit, in Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d
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under the Act presents a legal issue according to the Seventh
Amendment test, courts should include such damages in
"amounts owing" to be determined by a jury.
CONCLUSION
When possible, courts should interpret remedial statutes to
grant the right to a jury trial on legal issues in compliance with
the Seventh Amendment. This is especially so when Congress
has expressed its intent to conform with the constitutional
right to a jury trial, as it did in the ADEA. Front pay under
the ADEA presents a legal issue. Computation of front pay in
age discrimination suits would have come before a court of law
in 1791 had such a cause of action then existed. Juries rou-
tinely calculate future damages in other types of actions and
may have the assistance of a court-appointed master in unusu-
ally complex cases arising under the Act. Although equity may
have historically enjoined a legal claim for front pay through
clean-up jurisdiction, evolving Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence has undermined the viability of the equitable clean-up
doctrine. Furthermore, the ADEA readily lends itself to an in-
terpretation granting the right to jury computation of front
pay. To acknowledge the right of either party to a jury trial on
a claim for front pay under the ADEA conforms with congres-
sional intent, and more importantly, with the mandate of the
Seventh Amendment.
1249 (2d Cir. 1987), concluded otherwise. The Dominic opinion suggested that
"amounts owing" does not include an award of front pay. See id at 1257. In
Dominic, however, the court began with the assumption that front pay is a
form of equitable relief. The Court went on to state, quite accurately in light
of the legislative history of the jury trial provision, that "Congress . . .in-
tended to provide a right to a jury trial on all claims that it considered to be
'legal' in nature." Id Under the Dominic court's reasoning, if front pay is a
form of legal relief, as this Note argues, then the ADEA provides the right to a
jury trial on front pay.
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